in the Late Ottoman Empire" had to be canceled a er the Justice Minister denounced its organizers on the fl oor of parliament for "stabbing Turkey in the back" and police told university o cials that they could not guarantee the participants' safety. But the conference did eventually take place -four months later. Turkish translations of work published abroad on the genocide have appeared. And at least one historian teaching at a Turkish university has published an article that uses the g-word to describe what happened to Armenians in -admittedly, in an American journal. This lecture will not go into the evidence for whether or not it was Hitler who included the famous query about the Armenians in his Obersalzberg monologue, for both attack and defense of the text obscure a greater reality. Suppose it could be proven that the text had been enhanced by Hitler's opponents, as Lowry suggests, "for propaganda purposes," to make the Führer appear "in an extremely negative light" to allies and others. Such an enhancement would only underscore the iconic status of the Armenian genocide as the apex of horrors conceivable in .
My lecture aims at supplying the empirical basis for what is implicit in that sarcastic query, regardless of who posed it: that the Armenians and their extermination had once excited considerable "talk." Secondarily, I shall raise the question, without resolving it, of whether talk has consequences. The question implies an audience that thought so; otherwise, why the sneer about talk's transience, aimed at reassuring those about to embark, perhaps reluctantly, upon exterminations of their own? Finally, a demonstration of the ubiquity of talk about the extermination is evidence, prima facie, that an extermination occurred.
Talk about the extermination of Ottoman Armenians began in the mids, when Abdul Hamid II's massacres, with an estimated , victims, provoked an international outcry. In England, the House of Commons demanded that the Royal Navy force the Dardanelles and remove the sultan. The normally so fractious French united -from Dreyfusards to the monarchist Right -in pro-Armenian activism. In Russia, intellectuals from Chekhov to the philosopher Solov'ev raised nearly , rubles for Armenian relief, while little Switzerland collected a million francs (that's more than million in today's purchasing power) and more signatures on an Armenophil petition than any petition in Swiss history. Americans held "Armenian Sundays," when participants fasted to send the money saved to "starving Armenians." By , forty-nine countries were sharing these rituals of symbolic sacrifi ce.
Germany was slow to start, but by late young Johannes Lepsius had spearheaded a movement supporting Armenians, making him briefl y (in the words of a supporter) "the most famous man in Germany." Lepsius came from a family of distinguished academics and intellectuals. His father was the founder of German Egyptology; his grandfather, a friend of Goethe and the Grimms; his greatgrandfather, the Enlightenment publisher Nicolai. (His nephew, by the way, is the Bundesrepublik's most famous living sociologist.) But Lepsius himself was a rural pastor -soon made unemployed by Church authorities who disapproved of his activism. (I'll come back to him.) With the new century, massacres became fewer, closer to pogroms, until , when , more Armenians were slain in Adana province, reviving anew talk about the extermination of Armenians.
We must distinguish, of course, between noise in the public square and the intense but discreet exchanges in the corridors of power. To merge these two conversations was vital for Armenophils; to keep them apart, the goal of statesmen of all countries. For sooner or later "talk" meant pressure, and the last thing policy-makers wanted was the kind of moralizing speech that might limit their own freedom of action. Any restraints on Ottoman sovereignty, they feared, would compromise the Ottoman Empire's survival -and risk unleashing a war of all against all, in Anatolia, certainly, and perhaps in Europe. Thus, in the poker game of Great Power politics, as the historian Marion Kent has noted, "The Ottoman Empire held one trump card. This was the general desire of the European Powers for it to survive as a political entity." The Ottomans could play that card just as easily against Western humanitarianism as against Western imperialism. Thus the louder the outcry over the Armenians' plight, the more Europe's foreign o ces cooperated in their studied e orts at silence.
Yet behind closed doors, talk continued, as stacks of diplomatic fi les make clear. Discussions grew more heated with the Balkan Wars of -, when the Ottoman Empire lost more than percent of its population and almost all of its European territory. Europe's "sick man" appeared to be breathing his last. The collapse of Ottoman authority in the Balkans was expected to spread to Asia Minor, where whole new crops of separatists were emerging, from Beirut to the Persian frontier.
Would Armenian nationalists join the fray? Or would the returning Ottoman army, bitter over its Balkan losses, take out their anger on Armenian villagers? At the prospect of ethnic confl ict that might spill across the Caucasus, Russia began threatening to occupy Eastern Anatolia if credible protections for Armenians were not implemented immediately. Suddenly, preventing a massacre of Armenians became the task of every statesman committed to peace. For violence in Asia Minor, if it triggered Russian intervention, would surely be met by Austrian counteraction in the Balkans -with the risk of a general . In Paris, Pro Arménia, a journal defunct since , resumed publication. Speeches and queries in the British, Italian, and German parliaments refl ected and contributed to the disquiet. Jagow was forced to concede that the situation in the Orient had become "the most pressing of all political questions." Whether he and his counterparts liked it or not, they had to talk about the Armenians.
The consequence? The workload of Europe's exhausted diplomats, already crushing thanks to the ongoing Balkan crisis, increased dramatically. In June alone, over missives on the Armenian matter crossed the transoms of the Wilhelmstrasse. In Therapia, Baron Wangenheim was chained to his desk, his longed-for family holiday repeatedly postponed. Uncertain whether the future lay with the Armenians or the Turks, German diplomats began to work both sides of the street at what today is termed, euphemistically, the "peace process." With London's cooperation, Germany labored to square the circle: to secure protections for the Armenian minority that would not undermine Ottoman sovereignty -and thus obviate Russian intervention and all that might follow. On February , , Germany succeeded in brokering such an accord. Turkey ceded some of its sovereignty in Eastern Anatolia (to a Dutchman and a Norwegian, commissioners representing the "international community"), and Russia stopped threatening to occupy it. Would these "Armenian Reforms" stabilize Ottoman rule? Or would they, as some hoped and many feared, deliver it the coup de grâce? Whatever the answer, the reforms did not quiet talk about the Armenians. And nowhere, perhaps, was that talk louder than in Germany.
In June , a German-Armenian Society, aimed at fostering warmer relations between the two peoples, held its inaugural gala in Berlin. The very existence of such an organization betrayed the Foreign Offi ce's tilt. Only the sun of o cial favor could explain how an outfi t with a board composed of Lepsius, another pastor, a journalist, and six unknowns from the tiny Armenian colony in Berlin, had managed to collect the dazzling names, ninety-six in all, that graced the German-Armenian Society's appeal for members: four generals; the leaders of the Reichstag's two liberal parties; the Conservative president of Prussian Chamber of Deputies; and important representatives of business, church (for example, the court preacher, Ernst Dryander), and academia -including the historians Hans Delbrück and Rudolf Oncken.
Yet the desire to be in the government's good graces cannot explain the support of such glitterati as Germany's most celebrated painter, Max Liebermann; the social theorist Georg Simmel; the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, Rudolf Eucken; and the young novelist Thomas Mann, who would capture the same honor in . These men must already have been talking about the Armenians. And the editors of three of Germany's most infl uential dailies on the list of sponsors seemed to promise that from now on, talk on behalf of the Armenians would reach an ever widening public. 
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It was not to be. Within weeks, Europe was at war. On August , Germany signed a secret alliance with the Ottoman Empire. The German-Armenian Society suddenly became a political embarrassment. Its rival, the German-Turkish Union, now had a mission. The latter's managing director, Ernst Jäckh, was put on the government payroll, running a one-man development o ce for the new alliance.
Behind the scenes, "Jäckh-the-Turk," as he was called, spied on prominent Armenophils. Openly, his job was public education; its real aim: to sell Turkey to his countrymen.
It was not a di cult task. By the time the Ottoman Empire actually entered the war -on October , -the German public was reeling from three months of the deadliest combat of the entire confl ict. With losses of , men -killed, wounded, and missing in action -in the fi rst month alone, Germans hardly needed incentives to embrace the Turks as saviors.
The alliance proved a Full Employment Act for anyone with a colorable claim to expertise on the Ottoman Empire. German orientalists, long marginal in the academic pecking-order, rejoiced in their newfound prestige. Overnight the anemic enrollments in C. H. Becker's course on Turkey soared. Even language classes boomed. "Everyone," Professor Becker crowed, "wants to learn Turkish now!" His Göttin-gen counterpart, Enno Littmann, was amazed by the Turcomania. "Everything possible is appearing about the Orient and Islam," he marveled. Among the things now "possible" was a publication entitled "The Evolution of Turkey into a Rechtsstaat" -this, in .
Even as Ernst Jäckh and company were marketing the Ottoman Empire as the land of tolerance, Turkey's ruling cadre, a hard-line subset of the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress (CUP; henceforth, Unionist), were driving Armenians to their deaths. By late April , Germans in Turkey had begun to witness expulsions of Armenians from their villages. In May, deportations, accompanied by pillage, rape, and mass murder, snowballed. In July, the Italian consul in Trapezunt su ered a nervous breakdown under the weight of these sights.
But those who wanted the world to know what was going down in Eastern Anatolia faced formidable obstacles. In May , not just Armenians but all Western teachers, doctors, and missionaries were barred from using the mails. Then their telephones and telegraphs were confi scated. Envoys of neutral powers were forbidden to en- crypt their telegrams, and their letters were opened. Only the German embassy's diplomatic pouch remained a secure conduit for candid information on these gruesome events. Would it be willing to forward such explosive information? When, that April, a German consul tried to forward to Germany an account of a pogrom from a teacher at a German orphanage by including it in his bag, Ambassador Wangenheim refused to accept it until he had extracted a promise that the material would be released "neither through the press nor any other way." Even then, it took two months, and repeated requests, before the teacher's superiors in Frankfurt were allowed to receive the report, and then only in an oral, sanitized redaction.
Turkey's leaders usually denied their purpose -to rid Anatolia of its Armenians -even when they conceded that massacres were taking place.
Thus it was that Baron Wangenheim, who had protested sporadic brutalities against Armenians in the winter of , at fi rst accepted the Turkish story the following spring that the deportations were a military necessity, aimed at removing actual and potential fi h columns from the path of Russian invaders. As for the massacres that befell the deportees as they trudged away? They were regrettable failures of military discipline, which could happen in any wartime situation.
But the deception could not last long. Wangenheim has had a very bad press, thanks to the American ambassador, Henry Morgenthau. Writing a er the United States entered the war against Germany in a book that has become standard reading for those interested in the Armenian genocide, Morgenthau villainized Germany's ambassador as an arrogant Teuton, satisfi ed to see Armenians go to their ruin so long as it furthered "pan-German" goals. But, in fact, much as he wanted to believe the Young Turk story, the German ambassador never sacrifi ced his critical judgment on the altar of the alliance. In this respect, Wangenheim compares favorably to his British counterpart in St. Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan. In answer to London's anxious queries about reports of the Russian army's mass expulsions of the tsar's Jewish subjects along its border, Buchanan answered that he had not "the slightest doubt" that Jewish treason necessitated such harsh measures, assurances echoed uncritically by other Brits on the spot -soldiers, journalists, and even scholars. Unlike Buchanan, Wangenheim, although already a dying man, could still summon the energy to catch the Turkish government in fi ctions.
And by mid-June, he had concluded "that the banishment of the Armenians is not motivated by military considerations alone is clear 
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Conference Reports GHI News Forum Features as day." Indeed, shortly before that, the Minister of the Interior, Talât Bey, had stated frankly to an embassy o cial "that the Porte wanted to use the war to thoroughly clean out its domestic enemies -the native Christians -without being disturbed by diplomatic intervention from abroad ...'" On July , Wangenheim informed Germany's chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, that the extension of the deportations to provinces not threatened with invasion, as well as the manner in which they were carried out, convinced him that their ally was "in fact pursuing the aim of destroying the Armenian race in the Turkish empire."
The ambassador based his conclusion not only on Talât's comments, but also on an array of German witnesses: teachers, medical personnel, church people, civil engineers, soldiers -and reports from his own consular sta , which were detailed and compelling. Germany's consul in Aleppo would eventually earn a mild reprimand for his passionate protests against the treatment of the Armenians. Germany's man in Mosul was so moved by the famished creatures straggling by that he fed them himself. If the Foreign O ce was unwilling to foot the bill for the £ , well then, he declared, he'd pay it back to them out of his own salary, in monthly installments.
Then there was Lieutenant Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, who had been seconded to Eastern Anatolia to organize Muslim guerrillas behind Russian lines. Arriving in Erzerum, the heart of historic Armenia, Scheubner found himself pressed into service to run the vice-consulate there. Soon he was privy to the same grisly sights. Unionist hardliners bluntly informed him that their goal was the "complete extermination" of the Armenians. "A er the war, we will 'have no more Armenians in Turkey,' is the verbatim pronouncement of an authoritative personage," the young soldier reported. In August , Scheubner informed Wangenheim's stand-in that this grim goal had been attained -throughout the entire territory of his consulate.
Scheubner did not deny that there had been Armenian insurgents here and there. What could be more "natural" for a people so badly treated? But, in his view "any proof whatsoever" of a "general, intentional, and premeditated uprising by the Armenians is lacking." The very extent of the extermination proved the absurdity of Turkish claims: "… that tens of thousands of Armenians let themselves be butchered, without resisting, by a handful of Kurds and irregulars as happened here is surely proof of how very little taste this people has for fi ghting and revolution. Were people inside Germany also talking about the extermination of the Armenians? War means censorship -and the censor's strictures on what might be written about the Ottoman Empire exceeded in length even such awkward topics as "Belgium" and "U-Boat Warfare." The principle was simple: "All remarks that could in any way diminish the reputation of our Turkish allies or be wounding to them must be avoided." Any mention of the Armenians had to be submitted to pre-censorship. In fact, the Zensurbuch made plain, it wanted no mention of the Armenian question at all.
The press got the message. Although the Frankfurter Zeitung, Germany's most prestigious daily, had a veteran correspondent in Constantinople, he devoted his insider status to securing interviews with Unionist leaders and to disseminating their tale of Armenian treachery. Others did the same. During the genocide year of , Armenians were mentioned in the Berliner Tageblatt just fi ve times: two were reprints of rebuttals of Entente atrocity "propaganda" issued by the Ottoman press agency. The other three? Casual asides in interviews held by the Grand Vizier, by Talât Bey, and by the War Minister Enver Pasha. And with more than million of their own sons at the front, with pundits like Friedrich Naumann telling them that "everything turns on the Dardanelles," can anyone wonder that ordinary Germans let their ally's story of Armenian fi h columns go unchallenged?
And yet: numbers alone -on censorship guidelines, news items, German soldiers mobilized -cannot close the question of what Germans knew and said about the extermination of the Armenians. Unlike in the Third Reich, where the disclosure of genocide was a capital offense, penalties in Imperial Germany for circumventing censorship were light. Moreover, in Berlin, and probably in other large cities, Dutch, French, English, and even Russian newspapers remained on sale. Those unskilled in foreign languages could learn the news from the Swiss press. An information barrier so omnipresent yet so porous meant that Turkey's boosters faced the task of rebutting Entente atrocity reports that they could never be sure anyone had actually read.
The result was a mass of contradictions. Germans were told by their press that Armenians were being subjected to a just and necessary response to their treasonous aid to the Russian army. But they could also read that the Armenian Reforms of February had "proven themselves absolutely," that a "friendly relationship" Orientalists learned about it early on from colleagues in neutral countries and from students serving as interpreters in Turkey. Some, like Professor Littmann, were inclined to dismiss an American document on the Armenian fate. The future translator of Arabian Nights knew a good tale when he saw one; and anyway, Russia's expulsion of Poles and Lithuanians was no less harsh and its persecution of its Jews, as well as London's anti-German mobs, were worse. But details from former students became so copious that eventually, as his colleague, C. H. Becker, assured him, "the madness…" was "not to be doubted." By October , reports of massacres, Becker noted in an essay whose publication was quashed, "now fi ll the entire world."
Another source was Armin Wegner. Returning to Berlin a er serving as a medic in Turkey, the aspiring writer used readings of his new work to notify dovish intellectuals, like the art collector Count Harry Kessler and the journalist Hellmut von Gerlach. Gerlach took the news to the Federation for a New Fatherland (Bund Neues Vaterland), whose eclectic clientele stretched from Albert Einstein and the novelist Stefan Zweig, through the usual liberal, socialist, and feminist suspects (Eduard Bernstein, Clara Zetkin, Ernst Reuter), all the way up to liberal members of the government. But people! He himself, he was sorry to say, could do nothing. "The censor closed our mouths," Gerlach later explained. But how do we assess the censor's power, when self-censors were so obliging?
Talk about the "extermination of the Armenians" was not confi ned to professors and le ies, as we know from Gerald Feldman's magisterial study of the mighty Deutsche Bank in World War I. The bank owned controlling shares of the Anatolian Railway, and its Constantinople o ce was full of what Feldman described as "hair-raising accounts" of the Turkish government's determination (as the deputy director reported to his chief in Berlin, Arthur von Gwinner) "to eradicate" the Armenians -"the entire line: root and branch." A quarter of the population of roughly million, he estimated, had already perished. Eastern Anatolia was "armenierrein." "The Jewish pogroms in Russia, which I know," he stressed, "are comparative child's play."
What did the Deutsche Bank do with this knowledge? Gwinner's man protested to the Turks and reported in detail to his own Foreign O ce. The Railway saved as many Armenians as it could, hiring even the unqualifi ed for construction and o ce work. Its "lifeboat" bears comparison to Oskar Schindler's, and on a much larger scale. Gwinner himself designated £ , for immediate Armenian reliefsecretly. But he did nothing publicly, nor did he resign as chairman of Jäckh-the-Turk's German-Turkish Union, whose goals he continued to legitimate with his name.
Other key fi gures in business -Walther Rathenau, Hugo Stinnes, August Thyssen -must also have known. Wartime Constantinople was never o -limits to men with infl uence ("Every train from the Balkans brings Germans who want to monkey around with the Turks," a later German ambassador complained). Stinnes and Thyssen arrived in the winter of and talked with Germans who talked about the extermination of the Armenians. Among the "fl ood" of Germans on fact-fi nding missions was Gustav Stresemann, a rising star of the National Liberals, who met with newsmen, soldiers, expats, diplomats -and Enver Pasha. Stresemann's diary leaves no doubt that he learned exactly what was happening. On day he wrote: "Armenian reduction -½ million." Back in Germany, the future chancellor of the Weimar Republic made his infl uence felt. To the public, Stresemann's speeches refl ected the sunny face of the alliance, eulogizing the "tapferen Türken" to receptive audiences. To insiders, however, his picture was grim: on the Stresemann's traveling companion, Matthias Erzberger, the leader of the Catholic Le and by the most powerful man in the Reichstag, was already well-informed. As director of war propaganda for neutral countries, Erzberger was kept supplied by the Foreign O ce with the extenuations with which it armed its diplomatic personnel to rebut challenges about atrocity allegations. But Erzberger also had independent sources on what he called "this newest burning question"; most credibly, Catholic clergy on the spot. From "two absolutely reliable" men, Erzberger learned that murdered Christians numbered . million -the same fi gure as Stresemann's. "The Armenian nation," one of them confi ded,"is supposed to be pretty much exterminated."
Erzberger had several fi sh to fry when he arrived in the Ottoman capital in early . Not least, he wanted to persuade the Turkish government to turn over any Christian sites in Jerusalem that had been "vacated" by the Armenian Apostolic Church to his own, Roman Catholic, church. Still, in interviews with Enver and Talât, Erzberger did speak up for the Armenians, and back in Berlin he wrote to the Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne about their plight. He also sought out the Turkish ambassador and went to the Foreign O ce to defend Ambassador Metternich against his critics. Alarmed by all this negative talk about Turkey, Jäckh, at a board meeting of his GermanTurkish Union, denounced the "rumors" spread by Erzberger and Stresemann as completely baseless -which testifi es to their impact. In public, however, the normally so voluble Erzberger did not break the silence.
And, as a member of parliament, he might have. The arm of the censor stopped at the Reichstag door. Only the noise of his fellows (or the president's call to order) could silence a member. But noise and calls to order were precisely what occurred in January , when Karl Liebknecht, a radical Social Democrat, demanded to know whether the government was aware that its allies had annihilated " s of thousands" of Armenians, and that "Professor [sic] Lepsius" was calling it "fl at-out extermination"? Two days later Liebknecht was expelled from his party.
But murder will out. By , when a Center backbencher returned from Turkey with news of fresh massacres, Germany's last ambassador there threw up his hands. "So much has been spoken and written about the Armenian atrocities that it seems idle to express oneself on these questions." His exasperation is revealing. It seems that Germans could not stop talking about the extermination of the Armenians.
The Protestant clergy, recipients of constant streams of information from their own and international networks, talked most. They forwarded eyewitness accounts to the government, protested the press's complicity in Turkey's alibis, and badgered the Foreign Offi ce "to put a stop immediately to the murders by our…allies." In July , the monthly publication of a prominent Protestant charity for the Near East (circulation , ) was among the fi rst, in Germany or anywhere, to publish details of the genocide -which soon spread internationally. Reports like these were terrible for allied relations. But, groaned the chargé d'a airs in Constantinople, Konstantin von Neurath, an outright "repression of Germany's pro-Armenian associations" was "naturally out of the question." Nevertheless, the constant government pressure against negative publicity took its toll. Yes, the genocide remained on people's lips; otherwise that same German Charity could not have collected so much money for Armenian relief during the war. But in the public square where talk might have mattered, the Church's speech remained mu ed. Belief requires not only hearing talk from a credible source. It requires subjecting that talk to public debate. Precisely such a debate was forbidden.
In recent years, a number of historians have reiterated the Entente's charge that Germany was co-responsible for the Armenian genocide -a charge Armenians themselves have long believed. Others have countered that in the deadly game of Ottoman minority policy, Germany held few cards. As our once-skeptical Professor Littman put it: "In any case, would Turkey let us have a voice in a domestic matter?" He knew the answer: not if it could help it. The Entente's implicit demand that Germany ditch its allies was a cheap shot -certainly during their Gallipoli invasion, which overlapped almost precisely with the fi rst genocidal push, and even later, when Turks were tying down a million Entente troops. But there is something that all of us can demand of a society, even during a desperately fought war: that it not lie to itself.
"Living in the truth:" Václav Havel's famous line identifi es truth itself as a kind of power, available to men and women who have nothing else. Once someone steps out of the lie, Havel found, "he has shattered the world of appearances, the fundamental pillar of the system ... He has enabled everyone to peer behind the curtain. Living within the lie can constitute the system only if it is universal." An alternative threatens its very existence. Truth then becomes "the power of the powerless." It was an o er journalists could not refuse. News of Lepsius's chilling conversations in August with Constantinople's strongmen had already spread by word-of-mouth. Those who remembered how Lepsius's reports from the killing fi elds were soon published in translations abroad also knew that this was a man who knew how to get the world's attention. Articles circulating in the Swiss press on the extermination of more than a million Armenians suggested that Lepsius had already begun.
The next day Under Secretary of State Arthur Zimmermann summoned together the same reporters. While o ering lip service to the Turks' claim that it was the Armenians who were massacring the Turks, Zimmermann's main point was that, since nothing could be done for them anyway, Armenians were not worth the loss of an important ally.
Lepsius kept pushing. He spoke to the Wednesday Society, a group of intellectuals around Hans Delbrück and Adolf von Harnack. And he organized an array of Protestant Church leaders (men with reliable sources of their own), proposing they circulate a mass petition to the chancellor that explicitly reproved the government's disinformation policy: "It oppresses our conscience that the German press praises the nobility and tolerance of our Mohammedan allies, while Mohammedans are shedding rivers of innocent Christian blood." The petition predicted a "crippling impact on the morale of German Christians when they have to look on while their allies destroy an entire Christian people ... without our side doing whatever is possible to save them."
Yet precisely such visions of crippled morale raised anxieties within the petitioners' own ranks. Alarmed by their own courage, they wilted under pressure from Church authorities to scrap a mass signature drive. Their petition would remain confi dential, its signers limited to men in leadership roles. Even so, within a few days, of the most distinguished fi gures in German Protestantism had been persuaded to sign -an unprecedented step in a Church known for its expansive interpretation of "Render unto Caesar." At Lepsius's urging, Erzberger got a committee of the Catholic Lay Congress [Katholikentag] to issue a similar, although more anodyne, statement. Nothing remotely like this e ort -a movement opposing the policies of a wartime ally, for example, in Britain to protect Russia's Jews -occurred in any of the other belligerent powers. Chancellor Bethmann took notice. Referring to "mounting ... commotion in Germany," he instructed his ambassador to inform Turkey's leaders of the two petitions "at every opportunity, and emphatically." But Germany's "mounting commotion" remained private. By December , the Foreign O ce had managed to convince most Church leaders that public talk would be counterproductive for Armenians (and for Germans). Thus, debate within the Establishment was aborted before wider circles could learn of it. Outside the columns of a few religious publications (which usually employed Aesopian language), there was no public "talk" about the extermination of the Armenians. Yet Germany's Daniel Ellsberg (or Julian Assange?) kept on. The pandemonium that broke out in the Reichstag in January when Liebknecht referred to Lepsius's fi ndings was a telling sign that Lepsius's very name had become a synecdoche for the embarrassing genocide. Now Lepsius worked feverishly to put a comprehensive picture of the genocide into the hands of "every Protestant pastor" in Germany. to send to public fi gures, the press, and members of parliament. Lest so many identical parcels mailed in one place attract attention, his eleven children were conscripted to fan out over Potsdam, distributing them among corner mailboxes.
How successful were Lepsius's e orts? It's hard to tell. In August, the authorities impounded copies meant for Germany's elected representatives. A month later, the Turkish ambassador got wind of the Report and protested to the military authorities, who ordered the seizure of any remaining copies. But some of these Reports surely reached their destinations because by late September, Lepsius had received an astonishing , Marks for Armenian relief in response to the appeal inserted in each copy. We can also see Lepsius's efforts refl ected in the sharp criticism of the government's handling of the Armenian issue in the Reichstag's budget committee that September, as well as in the complaints of a hypernationalist, speaking that month before a crowd of thousands in Munich, about propaganda in Germany on behalf of the Armenians.
Lepsius's Report o ers some puzzles worth pondering. Given exploding paper costs, where did an unbenefi ced parson with eleven children get the money to publish and mail more than , copies of a -page book? Stamps alone would have cost , marks. Lepsius merely cites "friends of the good cause." Given rationing, where did he obtain the paper? Another mystery is Lepsius's continued freedom of movement. While Entente powers were quick to incarcerate their critics, Lepsius was threatened only with three days of jail and a Mark fi ne -and then only in .
Such forbearance suggests ambivalence. Even the policeman charged with executing the seizure order in September proceeded with a graveside praised him as the "Turkish Bismarck." Lepsius, on the other hand, testifi ed on behalf of Talât's assassin, whom a Berlin jury acquitted -to international approval, but to vilifi cation in Hugo Stinnes's Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, whose editor, the former naval attaché Hans Humann, continued the war against the Armenians by other means. In attacking and defending Armenians and Turks, Germans were attacking and defending each other.
The Armenian catastrophe thus meant di erent things to di erent Germans. For some, it meant mourning, and shame. There was standing room only at St. Hedwig's Cathedral, in the heart of Berlin, for a memorial service for the Armenian people. The invitation, from the German-Armenian Society, acknowledged that the genocide had always been an open secret. "As is well known," it said, "during the World War more than a million Armenians, on orders of the Turkish government, were massacred or deported to the desert ..." Although they knew that their countrymen did not feel directly responsible, the sponsors stated fl atly that, because of its Turkish alliance, Germany's share in this wrong was greater than that of any other people.
Most Germans, however, weighed down by their own sorrows, assimilated the genocide into a developing master narrative of German battles nobly fought, if nobly lost -as we can see in a biography of Lt. Scheubner-Richter, consul of Erzerum in , written by his adoring adjutant. In a work published fi ve years a er Hitler's seizure of power, we might expect a testosterone-poisoned paean to the healthy ruthlessness of the Young Turks. Instead, the author lingered over his hero's vigorous e orts to save Armenians. His preface proudly recalled his young commander in presenting him with Lepsius's newly-minted Deutschland und Armenien, Scheubner inscribing it to the "memory of common struggles for the honor of Germany's escutcheon.…" Other Germans drew di erent lessons. To Hitler, the genocide served as a warning of the doom that awaited weaker peoples. In , he cited the fate of the Armenians as what lay in store for Germans -if no rational solution were found to the Jewish problem. Eight years later, Hitler was complaining of the German press portraying "over and over, far and wide, the 'Armenian atrocities.'"
